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When an economy drops suddenly into recession, the paramount objective of any 
policy initiative is to avoid deflation. To that end, quantitative easing has little to offer. 
Arguments from the 1930s are assessed within the context of the recent Global 
Financial Crisis, where the preceding twenty years of the Great Moderation had left 
economists high on hubris. In avoiding their deserved comeuppance, economists 
continue to parade an ever-more sophisticated intertwining of statistical data within 
mathematical relationships that is essentially divorced from social and political 
relevance. Though sorely needed, the broad strokes of a politico-historical perspective 
are rarely found within the purview of current mainstream economics.  
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A central bank may act either to ease or to tighten money. The conventional policy choice has been set 
within a ‘Rule’ (Taylor, 1993), which indicates adjustments to the short-term interest rate that are perceived 
to be necessary to counter variations in inflation and unemployment. At the onset of the Global Financial 
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Crisis, New York Times columnist and Princeton economist Paul Krugman presented a Taylor Rule interest-
rate calculation of minus 6 per cent, as necessary to mitigate the anticipated downturn. Given the thought 
that potential ‘lenders will just hoard cash’, that call for a negative policy rate was not taken seriously. 
Instead, there was a despairing ‘Mayday’ call for ‘a huge fiscal stimulus, unconventional monetary policy 
and anything else you can think of to fight this slump’ (Krugman, 2009). As short-term rates have remained 
close to the zero lower bound in the years that have followed, central banks have attempted to maintain the 
stimulus by means of asset purchase programmes; i.e., quantitative easing. 
A policy of quantitative easing involves a central bank exchanging one kind of debt (central bank money) 
for another kind of debt (bonds), which alters both the ownership and the term-structure of debt. In the UK, 
the Bank of England created £435 billion of new money in order to purchase (mostly sovereign) bonds. As 
bond prices rose in response to that additional demand, market competition reduced long-term interest rates 
and, therefore, the cost of corporate borrowing. The idea was to encourage investment.  
Following upon the substantial use of quantitative easing is a suggestion to avoid its future use by raising 
the inflation target above 2%. According to Janet Yellen (as Chair of the US Federal Reserve), the concern 
is that policy may  
be constrained by the zero lower bound more frequently than at the time that we adopted our 2 percent 
objective. So, it’s that recognition that causes people to think we might be better off with a higher 
inflation objective, and that’s an important set. This is one of our most critical decisions and one we are 
attentive to evidence and outside thinking’ (Yellen, 2017). 
It might be noted that the effective lower bound can be less than zero, as evidenced by the current negative 
policy rates of the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank. The explanation for a lower bound 
is that, if bank deposits earn negative interest, depositors would be better-off holding zero-earning 
banknotes, but only if the rate on deposits is sufficiently negative to cover the cost of storage and insurance 
of the banknotes. 
Another aspect of quantitative easing that attracts comment are its distributional effects. As former 
bondholders rebalanced their asset portfolios and as lower interest rates encouraged greater indebtedness, 
wealthier households gained most from the impact of quantitative easing on asset values, including those of 
equity and real estate. With savers generally ‘losing out’, households with mortgages benefited from 
lowered interest rates, as rising house values told against first-time buyers. A fall in long-term rates boosted 
corporate investment; but pension funds and insurance companies saw the capitalised value of their 
liabilities rise in relation to the value of their assets. This reduced the value of annuities to those entering 
retirement. As businesses diverted funds to support company pension schemes and as savers’ incomes fell, 
other expenditures were curtailed.  
It is therefore evident that, in applying quantitative easing, the central bank is making decisions that have 
extensive distributional consequences and which are the proper domain of the elected government. Before 
quantitative easing was applied, the central bank’s task was merely to choose the interest rate appropriate to 
meet its mandated inflation target. It was given independence from government in this task in order to 
insulate it from government bias. Yet, the distributional impact of quantitative easing raises the question as 
to whether it should remain independent: 
the independence doctrine becomes impossible to uphold when monetary policy comes to involve 
choices of inflating or deflating, of favouring debtors or creditors, of selectively bailing out some and 
not others, of guaranteeing some private sector liabilities and not others, of allowing or preventing banks 
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to collude. No democratic country can leave these decisions to unelected technicians (Leijonhufvud, 
2009, 748-49). 
Ersatz quantitative easing 
Quantitative easing merely exchanges new money (central bank reserves) for sovereign bonds; i.e., when a 
central bank buys bonds, a seller is paid by means of a deposit in a commercial bank and that bank, in turn, 
acquires a claim on the central bank (central bank reserves). In other words, the central bank puts ‘new 
money’ into the hands of banks, which the banks can lend. Regardless of whether that bank lending takes 
place, the reserves created by quantitative easing remain unchanged, which has led to criticism of banks for 
not increasing their lending.  
That criticism exposes a basic misunderstanding. When a bank lends its reserves which a borrower spends, 
those reserves necessarily become the asset of some other bank. Unless or until quantitative easing is 
reversed (or commercial bank deposits are withdrawn as banknotes), the value of central bank reserves that 
are collectively held by commercial banks remains unchanged, irrespective of the banks’ lending 
behaviour.  
With a number of established economists of considerable repute appearing to have misunderstood the 
relevance of quantitative easing (among whom Alan Blinder, Martin Feldstein, Allan Meltzer and John 
Taylor have been cited: see Sheard, 2013), those who are less versed in the dismal science might be 
forgiven for their own failings. This applies to propositions emanating (for example) from Jeremy Corbyn, 
John McDonnell and Robert Skidelsky:  
One option would be ... to invest in new large scale housing, energy, transport and digital projects: 
Quantitative easing for people instead of banks (Corbyn, 2015); 
.. the last round of quantitative easing increased the price of assets and poured money into their [i.e., 
hedge fund managers] pockets. If you design it properly and make sure it goes into infrastructure and 
skills you can grow the economy .. (McDonnell, 2015); 
An alternative would be to distribute the central bank’s newly issued money directly to housing 
associations, local councils, or national or regional investment banks - any organisation that could carry 
out infrastructure projects (Skidelsky, 2016). 
None of those propositions, nor others similar in nature, relates to quantitative easing. Yet, in categorising 
(without aspersion) those propositions as ‘ersatz quantitative easing’, it can be shown how these have an 
affinity with right-of-centre (i.e., market orientated) arguments emanating from the University of Chicago 
in the 1930s.  
As with the recent Global Financial Crisis, the focus in the 1930s was upon macroeconomic policy in the 
face of a severe economic downturn. Although policy options are ever controversial, there is timeless 
agreement on one simple issue: it is better to avoid deflation. Falling prices raise both the real value of 
nominal debt and the incentive to defer expenditure. As both are likely to exacerbate a recession, the 
motivation for quantitative easing has been to counteract deflation; but the effectiveness of quantitative 
easing to achieving that end must be doubted.1 
Avoiding deflation 
Prominent among reactions to the Wall Street Crash of 1929, were the arguments from the University of 
Chicago.2 A prime-mover was Henry Calvert Simons, who was as resolute in defending the role of prices 
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within a market economy as he was vociferous in opposing Maynard Keynes’s call for public works. In his 
review of Keynes’s General Theory, Simons writes that, where Keynes expresses a  
decided preference for an economic system of free enterprise, he does not seriously consider what 
monetary arrangements or what implementations of monetary policy are most and least compatible 
with that system (Simons, 1936, p. 92).  
Given Keynes’s explicit support for the price system, markets and the freedom to choose, Simons 
castigated his espousal of fiscal deficit spending as ‘a highly diffuse kind of political interference’ (ibid.). 
The alternative prospectus argued by Simons is that the ‘monetary financing’3 of fiscal deficits 
unambiguously provides the force to counter deflation, where  
the Treasury would be the primary administrative agency; …. The powers of the government to inject 
purchasing power through expenditure and to withdraw it through taxation - i.e., the powers of 
expanding and contracting issues of actual currency and other obligations more or less serviceable as 
money - are surely adequate to price-level control (Simons, 1936, p. 22). 
Simons saw no case for public works. Instead, new purchasing power from fiscal deficits is better delivered 
by tax reductions: 
What is needed during depressions is deficits, not expenditures; and deficits may properly be obtained by 
tax reductions as well as through emergency outlays. … Adequate reflationary deficits could be obtained 
without tossing money recklessly in all directions, without reliance on the hurried schemes of bureaucrats, 
without the numerous disadvantages of “emergency public works,” and without the awful prospect of fiscal 
reflation carried far beyond the time when it should be reversed (Simons, 1938, p. 223). 
The UK Treasury View 
The argument made from Chicago runs close to that articulated a few years earlier on behalf of the UK 
Treasury, when Winston Churchill countered agitation for increased spending from the Liberal Party. In his 
budget speech of 1929, Churchill cited  
the orthodox Treasury doctrine which has steadfastly held that, whatever might be the political and 
social advantages, very little additional employment, and no permanent additional employment can, in 
fact, and as a general rule, be created by state borrowing and state expenditure (House of Commons, 
1929, p. 54). 
The upshot of the ‘Treasury View’ is that new credit per se, rather than its use to finance public works, is 
the force which counters deflation. The argument had not been that public works create no employment, but 
that  
a creation of credit unaccompanied by any expenditure on public works would be equally effective in 
giving employment. The public works are merely a piece of ritual, convenient to people who want to be 
able to say that they are doing something, but otherwise irrelevant (Hawtrey, 1925, p. 44). 
Long before a zero lower bound had been mooted, Ralph Hawtrey had acknowledged that a policy initiative 
to counteract a ‘credit deadlock’ could mobilise resources; but bank credit is the essential factor: ‘If the new 
works are financed by the creation of bank credits, they will give additional employment’ (Hawtrey, 1925, 
p. 43); and if public works give employment when financed by credit, then credit creation unaccompanied 
by public works would be equally effective. 
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In more detail, Hawtrey had argued that, if public works are privately resourced and if the stock and 
circulation of money remain unchanged, resources must be drawn, either from income that would otherwise 
have been saved (so reducing private investment) or from privately hoarded money balances. With the 
latter, individuals are assumed to reduce their expenditure to rebuild their money holdings. Either way, 
public works deliver no net boost for recovery.  
Keynes was not impressed by Hawtrey’s arguments. Although aware that Hawtrey’s views had been ‘used’ 
by the UK Treasury, he dismissed the core idea. In an open letter to President Roosevelt, he described 
credit creation per se as  
trying to get fat by buying a larger belt. … It is a most misleading thing to stress the quantity of money, 
which is only a limiting factor, rather than the volume of expenditure, which is the operative factor 
(Keynes, 1933, p. 234). 
The contemporary context of Hawtrey’s 1925 paper is important. Like Keynes, Hawtrey had favoured the 
return of sterling to the gold standard, but not at any cost. With the UK in the final stages of restoring the 
prewar dollar-sterling parity prior to reestablishing gold convertibility, there had been sharp rises in bank 
rate, even as unemployment rose above 10%. Hence, the absurdity: proposals for public works were being 
made as the central bank was doing all it could to prevent credit from rising. Keynes’s pamphlet of 1925 - 
The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill - was similarly focused upon that same absurdity: 
The President of the Board of Trade has asserted in the House of Commons that the effect of the 
restoration of the gold standard upon our export trade has been “all to the good.” The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer has expressed the opinion that the return to the gold standard is no more responsible for the 
condition of affairs in the coal industry than is the Gulf Stream. These statements are of the feather-
brained order (Keynes, 1925, p. 208). 
Deflation: the key issue 
The sources from which fiscal expenditure can be financed are taxes upon the wealth and income of 
individuals and corporations. With gross domestic product (GDP) serving as an approximate metric for the 
sources from which taxation is raised, the sovereign-debt-to-GDP-ratio (‘debt ratio’) is indicative of 
taxpayers’ capacity to repay sovereign debt. (That consideration provides the rationale for the much-
ignored sixty percent upper limit to sovereign debt across the eurozone.) An unrestrained increase in the 
debt ratio is bound, eventually, to cause default or inflation. 
Simons delivers scarcely-veiled criticisms of Keynes and gives no support to the ‘hurried schemes of 
bureaucrats’ or to ‘emergency public works’. Yet, his own recommendations for tax reductions to counter 
deflation in the 1930s would similarly have caused the debt ratio to rise, resulting in a reduced capacity to 
deliver sufficient fiscal surpluses to repay sovereign debt. This is the crucial point. The force that leads to 
inflation (or to arrest deflation) are rising concerns among financial market investors, about the likelihood 
of sovereign debt being repaid. 
Whether it is achieved indirectly by the revised judgement of investors or directly by the issue of central 
bank money and/or sovereign bonds, this is the essence of the proposals from Jeremy Corbyn, John 




The absurdity in the 1920s of a high bank rate coexisting with high unemployment is paralleled during the 
Global Financial Crisis by the implementation of austerity measures4 and the raising of regulatory bank 
capital ratios; i.e., action more likely to induce, than to prevent, deflation.  
‘What is it that economists do?’  
The Global Financial Crisis caught many on their back foot. Twenty-or-so years of the ‘Great Moderation’ 
(a period of steady non-inflationary economic growth) had set bankers, economists, politicians, and pundits 
at ease within what turned out to be their fools’ paradise. (In the UK, Gordon Brown would later be 
remorselessly ridiculed for his mantra of ‘No return to boom and bust’.)  
Among the many explanations for the Great Moderation are advances in information technology, the 
independence of central banks, financial deregulation, trade liberalisation and greater financial versatility. 
Alan Greenspan (Federal Reserve Chairman, 1987-2006) had helped to sustain the boom by means of his 
‘Greenspan put’: periodically reducing policy interest rates to counter every sharp fall in equity prices. It 
was only after the inevitable denouement that the general public (and, indeed, H. M. the Queen5) had cause 
to reflect and to ask how the Global Financial Crisis had not been anticipated; or more succinctly, ‘What is 
it that economists do?’ 
Of course it is desirable to find the means to ameliorate the boom and bust of business cycles, but that is an 
elusive goal. Yet the prevailing fashion, of uncritically concentrating analysis on ever-more sophisticated 
mathematical modelling and data analysis, has been of little value in addressing the issues at hand. The 
strictures upon economics as a quantitative science are rarely heeded: ‘[o]ur precision will be a mock 
precision if we try to use such partly vague and non-quantitative concepts as the basis of a quantitative 
analysis’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 40). Instead, economic policy interventions are now analysed with shows of 
mathematical and statistical sophistication that are as likely to impede as to aid understanding.  
Practitioners of the pseudo-science tend not to accentuate the provisos which they make in delivering their 
diagnosis, prognosis and cure. For example, ‘[t]he financial crisis in 2008 led to the UK economy suffering 
its deepest recession since the Second World War … leading to a decade of stagnating real earnings 
growth’ (Bunn, et.al., 2018, p. 7); and though the monetary policy response to the Global Financial Crisis 
‘was not enough to prevent a deep recession’, without such intervention 
the economic outcomes may have been much worse. Carney (2016) and Haldane (2016) describe a 
simulation from the Bank’s forecasting model which implies that GDP would have been up to 8% lower 
than it actually was if there had been no change in monetary policy’ (ibid.). 
Note that, although all the caveats are in place, their prominence is slight. Without intervention a situation 
‘may have been much worse’. And a ‘simulation’ produced by a ‘forecasting model’ gives confirmation to 
that conclusion. 
Descriptions of events become explanations only when they are compared (speculatively) to what might 
have been. As every counterfactual scenario must pass the (non-quantitative test) of plausibility, it would be 
convenient to conclude by citing Winston Churchill once more: ‘Those who fail to learn from history are 
condemned to repeat it’. With no evidence to support that attribution,6 the alternative, more telling 
conclusion is that the broad lessons that can be drawn from a politico-historical perspective tend not to lie 
within the current purview of ‘modern’ mainstream economics, which showcases instead its preference for 
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1 Quantitative easing in Japan (2001-2006) was judged ineffective and abandoned. See Werner, 2013. 
2 The Chicago Plan for banking reform was the most prominent feature. 
3 Monetary financing exists where public works or tax cuts are financed by the creation of central bank 
money. It would also apply if quantitative easing were a permanent feature; i.e., if the central bank creates 
money to purchase sovereign bonds and for that measure to remain permanently in place. 
4 Austerity had followed a change of government in 2010, when the outgoing Chief Secretary to the UK 
Treasury left a note for his successor: ‘I’m afraid to tell you there's no money left’.  
5 On a visit to the London School of Economics in 2008, H. M. the Queen asked ‘why had nobody noticed 
that the credit crunch was on its way?’ (Besley and Hennessy, 2009). The summary response was that, in 
the period to 2007, low interest rates had caused indebtedness to soar. Yet, financial analysts believed that 
ways had been found to reduce the associated risks to manageable levels: 
‘Everyone seemed to be doing their job properly on its own merit. And according to standard measures of 
success, they were often doing it well. … the failure to foresee the timing, extent and severity of the crisis 
and to head it off … was principally a failure of the collective imagination of many bright people, both in 
this country and internationally, to understand the risks to the system as a whole’ (ibid.). 
6 Convenient, but wrong. As a search for key phrases brought no results, Churchill Museum archivists 
concluded that Churchill ‘never repeated Santayana in so many words’. As his best remark on the subject, 
they cited a speech delivered by Churchill on May 2 1935: 
‘When the situation was manageable it was neglected, and now that it is thoroughly out of hand we apply 
too late the remedies which then might have effected a cure. There is nothing new in the story. It is as old 
as the sibylline books. It falls into that long, dismal catalogue of the fruitlessness of experience and the 
confirmed unteachability of mankind. Want of foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be 
simple and effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until the emergency comes, until self-
preservation strikes its jarring gong - these are the features which constitute the endless repetition of 
history’ (National Churchill Museum Blog Archive, 2016). 
